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Abstract 
The mobilization of substantial domestic resources is required to finance human and physical capital in 
order to achieve the sustainable development goals. In developing countries like those of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the mobilization of tax revenues remains a great challenge. In this context, identifying the 
determinants of fiscal capacity remains crucial to guide the adoption of appropriate fiscal reforms. 
Therefore, as part of the wave of literature on the institutional and political determinants of fiscal 
capacity, this article explores the effect of political legitimacy on tax revenues in a sample of 41 SSA 
countries over the period 1996-2017. The system GMM in two steps estimator is used for empirical 
investigation. The result shows that tax revenue increases with political legitimacy. This result suggests 
that political legitimization in SSA remains crucial to mobilize more resources in order to adequately 
finance the development. 
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1. Introduction 
The mobilization of substantial financial resources is necessary to achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. Given the volatility and unpredictability of official development 
assistance and the need for sustainable public debt, the focus in developing countries will be on 
domestic tax revenues. The mobilization of domestic tax revenue makes it possible to fund the 
accumulation of physical and human capital, the ingredients necessary for robust economic growth. 
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Likewise, it enables the provision of public services, in particular to the poorest sections of the 
population, and in turn to ensure inclusive development (Babatunde, Ibukun, & Oyeyemi, 2017). 
In view of its pivotal role in the development process, researchers questioned the determinants of tax 
revenues. In this vein, the first works looked at structural and macroeconomic factors such as per capita 
income, the size of foreign trade sector, the sectoral composition of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
inflation, trade openness and population (Lotz & Morss, 1967; Shin, 1969; Lotz & Morss, 1970). For 
these authors, these factors, in determining the tax base, explain the difference in tax revenues across 
countries. However, they recognize that these factors alone do not explain the difference in fiscal 
capacity between countries. For example, in his empirical analysis, Shin (1969) found that per capita 
income, the rate of change in prices, the population growth rate, the foreign trade and the agricultural 
share in GDP explain 73% of total variation in the tax ratio in a sample of 47 high and low income 
countries, 18.9% in the high income countries and 47.4% in the 31 low income countries. Other factors 
must therefore be explored.  
In this context, the authors have highlighted the relevance of institutional and governance factors in the 
ability of countries to raise taxes. Empirical evidence show that corruption, the voice and accountability 
and the political stability among others influence tax revenues (Ghura, 1998; Gupta, 2007; Bird, 
Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2008; Epaphra & Massawe, 2017). In the same logic, to better 
understand the gap in fiscal capacity between countries, DiJohn (2007) suggests taking into account the 
political nature of taxation. Indeed, a country’s tax system is a reflection of its political institutions 
(Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2014). In accordance with his point of view, it is increasingly 
recognized that theoretically, political legitimacy, by improving voluntary tax compliance, facilitating 
the broadening of the tax base and the success of tax reforms, affects tax revenue (Fauvelle-Aymar, 
1999; DiJohn, 2007; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2014). This paper contributes to the literature 
by empirically investigating the effect of political legitimacy on tax revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). 
In Africa, especially in its sub-Saharan part, mobilizing tax revenue to fund public services provision 
and infrastructures to achieve the SDGs remains a great challenge. The average tax-to-GDP ratio was 
17.2% in African countries in 2017, against 22.8% and 34.2% respectively for Latin America and 
Caribbean and OECD countries (OECD/ATAF/AUC, 2019). Moreover, the International Monetary 
Fund (2018) reported that SSA has the lowest revenue-generating capacity compared to other regions in 
the world, despite its progress in recent years. Similarly, there are significant differences in fiscal 
capacity between the countries of the region. In 2017, the share of tax revenue in the GDP ranged from 
5.7% in Nigeria to 31.5% in the Seychelles (OECD/ATAF/AUC, 2019). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The section 2 presents literature review. The section 3 
describes the methodology used for empirical investigation. The section 4 presents and discusses the 
empirical findings. The last section concludes. 
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2. Political Legitimacy and Tax Revenue: A Brief Literature Review 
In this section, the concept of political legitimacy is reviewed before the link between it and tax 
revenue is established. 
2.1 Concept of Political Legitimacy and Its Components 
According to Tyler (2006), legitimacy is «the belief that authorities, institutions, and social 
arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just». For the author, by virtue of legitimacy, citizens feel 
that they ought to defer to rulers’ decisions and rules, following them voluntarily out of obligation 
rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward. A trustworthy government that operates 
according to procedural justice spawns legitimacy beliefs (sense of obligation and willingness to obey 
or value-based legitimacy), which thereafter leads to greater compliance (behavioural legitimacy) (Levi 
& Sacks, 2009; Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009; Levi, 2019). Political legitimacy is then a popular approval 
of rulers by citizens and their compliance with government regulations and laws (Fauvelle-Aymar, 
1999; Levi & Sacks, 2009; Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009). This means that a legitimate government is one 
whose selection, the exercise of power and policies are widely accepted (Levi, 2019).  
Political legitimacy has two components: procedural justice and trustworthiness of government (Levi, 
Sacks, & Tyler, 2009). Beside, in the literature, it is sometimes conceptualized as the rule of law 
(Tamanaha, 2012; Ramcilovic-Suominen & Epstein, 2015; Canevaro, 2017), sometimes as trust or 
confidence in government (OECD, 2013; Berggren, Bjørnskov, & Lipka, 2015). 
The first facet of government legitimacy, procedural justice, modulates the people behaviour. Indeed, 
citizen behaviour is a function of the extent to which the procedures of government are consistent with 
the principles of the rule of law (Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009). Thereby, the rule of law is a major source 
of legitimation for governments in the modern world (Tamanaha, 2012; Canevaro, 2017). It means that 
government officials and citizens are both bound by and abide by the law (Tamanaha, 2012) and has 
two aspects (Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009). The first is that the government procedures are neutral, 
transparent, and rule based. The second aspect means that these procedures are respectful both of 
citizens as people and of their rights as members of the political community. A government that abides 
by the rule of law is seen as good and worthy of respect and is more legitimate when its actions is 
viewed by citizens to be consistent with fair procedures and rules (Tyler, 2006; Tamanaha, 2012). In 
addition to shared values, legitimacy requires the proof that rulers act in accordance with commonly 
accepted principles (Levi, 2019). 
In general, the legal framework of taxation requires that its collection comply with the rule of law 
(Vanistendael, 1996). Therefore, no tax can be collected unless the law expressly provides for it, and it 
must be applied impartially. Taxation according to the rule of law gives citizens protection from 
arbitrary taxation by tax authorities, assures them certainty or predictability in taxation and reinforce 
power credibility and legitimacy.  
The second dimension of legitimacy, trust, is a form of general social capital associated with a society 
and means holding a positive perception about the actions of an individual or an organization (OECD, 
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2013; Anderson, 2017). According to OCDE (2013), trust in government matters because it is one of 
the most important foundations upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are 
built. Moreover, it affects governments’ ability to govern and enables them to act without having to 
resort to coercion.  
2.2 Link between Political Legitimacy and Taxation 
Political legitimacy matters for mobilizing greater tax revenue domestically to ensure public 
investments required for economic and social development. It does not only improve moral and tax 
compliance but also expands the tax base and reduces tax evasion through the use of resources by 
taxpayers.  
2.2.1 Political Legitimacy and Tax Compliance 
The legitimacy of government is an essential determinant of the fiscal capacity of countries through its 
effect on taxpayers’ behaviour. Indeed, a strand of literature revealed that the extent to which countries 
can extract revenues through taxation at any given level of economic activity depend on taxpayers’ 
compliance (Papp & Takáts, 2008; Alabede, Ariffin, & Idris, 2011; Gaber & Gruevski, 2012; Besley & 
Persson, 2013; Varotsis & Katerelos, 2020). Tax compliance refers to the willingness of individuals 
and other taxable entities to act in accordance with the spirit as well as the letter of tax law and 
administration without the application of enforcement activity (James & Alley, 2002). Otherwise, it is 
the compliance with reporting requirements, meaning that the taxpayer files all required tax returns at 
the proper time and that the returns accurately report tax liability in accordance with the internal 
revenue code, regulations and court decisions applicable at the time the return is filed (Devo, 2005).  
However, taxpayers’ perceptions of the government’s legitimacy determine tax compliance attitudes 
and behaviours. As political legitimacy theorists so well point out, citizens are all the more inclined to 
pay the tax when they consider that public authorities are legitimate (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Tyler, 
2006; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2008; Berggren, Bjørnskov, & Lipka, 2015; 
Castañeda-Rodríguez, 2018). This is all the truer since many tax systems around the world rely on 
voluntary compliance of taxpayers (Jimenez & Iyer, 2016). When the governments and the institutions 
are legitimate, citizens have a predisposition to consider obedience to them as reasonable and 
appropriate and comply with tax law (Bird, 2013). Tax compliance becomes, in some ways, a habit. In 
this case, peoples are more likely to entrust public officials with their money. Thus, legitimacy boosts 
quasi-voluntary tax compliance (Lledo, Schneider, & Moore, 2004), and subsequently the level of tax 
revenue. In addition, Yogo and Njib (2018) argued that a more political competition induces more 
political legitimacy and increases the consent of citizens to pay taxes. 
Conversely, low legitimacy of government increases citizens’ tax opposition and reduce tax revenue. 
The less the citizens believe that the government is legitimate, the less they will accept their obligation 
to give it the revenue it needs to govern (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999). The positive link between political 
legitimacy and tax compliance proxy variables is broadly supported by many survey-based empirical 
evidences (Birskyte, 2014; Gobena & Dijke, 2016; Anderson, 2017; OECD, 2019). For example, 
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OECD (2019) reveals that in Africa, trust in government positively influence tax moral and in turn 
voluntary tax compliance and tax revenues. However, in a study based on four SSA countries, Ali, 
Fjeldstad and Sjursen (2014) found that there is no significant link between political legitimacy and tax 
compliance. 
Moreover, as Torgler (2012) pointed out, the relationship between taxpayers and government is a 
relational contract. This contract based on taxation needs to be maintained and validated continuously, 
which in turn is more likely when the government is seen as legitimate by a majority of taxpayer 
(Castañeda-Rodríguez, 2018). 
2.2.2 Political Legitimacy and Success of Tax Reforms 
A substantial increase in tax revenue in developing countries requires the adoption and implementation 
of sustainable tax policy reforms (Akitoby, Baum, Hackney, Harrison, Primus, & Salins, 2020). To be 
successfully implemented, these reforms require the approval from a variety of social actors and must 
be endogenous (Lledo, Schneider, & Moore, 2004; Bird, 2013; Hassan & Prichard, 2016). In other 
words, the success of reforms depends on their legitimacy and therefore stands for political legitimation 
(Lledo, Schneider, & Moore, 2004; DiJohn, 2007; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2014). In the 
case of Bangladesh, Hassan and Prichard (2016) reported that failure to reform the tax system 
repeatedly is linked to resistance to change in the business, political and administrative community.  
2.2.3 Political Legitimacy, Tax Base and Tax Evasion 
In addition to voluntary tax compliance and tax reforms success, political legitimacy affects tax 
revenues by expanding the tax base and limiting tax evasion. Indeed, as Berggren, Bjørnskov and Lipka 
(2015) suggested, in an environment marked by the weak legitimacy of leaders, individuals are more 
encouraged to take measures in the form of rent seeking or tax evasion to protect their income.  
The search for rent leads to the allocation of resources to unproductive activities, thus limiting 
economic growth. In a context of distrust atmosphere, citizens and businesses become more risk-averse, 
delaying investment, innovation and employment decisions (OECD, 2013). This atmosphere reduces 
individuals’ incentives and achievements, and increases the cost of doing business (Birskyte, 2014). 
Conversely, trust fosters a better environment for the operation of the economy and the creation of 
businesses (Castro & Camarillo, 2014). Legitimacy creates a psychological effect among the 
population, leading it to consider a given tax level as less burdensome (Berggren, Bjørnskov, & Lipka, 
2015). The authors argue that if the citizens consider government to be legitimate, they are more likely 
to approve the way that he uses tax revenue, which provides a motivation to work and invest more at 
given tax rates compared to a situation where government legitimacy is low (Berggren, Bjørnskov, & 
Lipka, 2015). Accordingly, legitimacy creates an environment for improving the tax base and therefore 
increasing tax revenue while the deficit of legitimacy erodes the tax base and consequently reduces tax 
revenues.  
Similarly, when citizens consider that the authorities are illegitimate, they are more inclined to carry 
out tax evasion with the aim of protecting their income. Tax evasion is done either inside or outside the 
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country. Internally, taxpayers take shelter in the informal sector. However, the shadow economy is 
difficult to identify and tax, and tax revenues fall with its size (Keho, 2015). At the external level, 
taxpayers’ resort to capital flight, preferring to keep their assets in foreign countries. This has the 
consequence of reducing the amounts liable to be collected in the form of taxes and consequently tax 
revenue. 
 
3. Methodology 
In this section, the empirical model is first specified. Then the variables used and their source are 
presented. Finally, the choice of estimation method is justified. 
3.1 Empirical Model Specification 
To evaluate the link between political legitimacy and tax revenue, we propose the following functional 
form: 
                         𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑋𝑋)                                                                                         (1) 
In this equation, tax revenue is a function of Political Legitimacy (PL) and a set of control variables (X). 
The control variables are chosen in accordance with the literature on the determinants of tax revenue, in 
particular the first empirical investigations (Lotz & Morss, 1967; Shin, 1969; Lotz & Morss, 1970) and 
the work devoted to SSA countries (Ghura, 1998; Epaphra & Massawe, 2017). They include per capita 
GDP, the sectoral composition of output, the degree of trade openness, and the inflation rate.  
In general, most fiscal variables are characterised by strong inertia over time (Ebeke & Ölcer, 2013). 
Likewise, according to Besley and Persson (2013), the stock of fiscal capacity today depends on that 
inherited from the past. Taking into account the panel dimension, the inertia of tax variables and the 
control ones, a first-order dynamic panel model is specified as follows:         𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (2) 
In the equation (2), 𝛆𝛆𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 is the error term; 𝐢𝐢 represents the country and 𝐢𝐢 the period. 
3.2 Presentation and Source of Variables 
The dependent variable, the explanatory variable of interest and the control variables are successively 
presented. The dependent variable 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is total tax revenue of government, excluding social 
contributions as a share of GDP. They are made up of direct and indirect taxes and taxes on foreign 
trade. The fiscal capacity of countries is approximated by this variable in several empirical works 
(Ghura, 1998; Gupta, 2007; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2008, 2014; Epaphra & Massawe, 
2017). 
Political legitimacy 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the independent variable of interest. From the review presented in the 
previous section, it appears that political legitimacy can be approximated by the rule of law or trust in 
government. In the model considered as the basic one, the political legitimacy is approximated, as 
suggested by Tamanaha (2012), Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein (2015) and Canevaro (2017), by the 
rule of law. Rule of law captures the perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
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police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2010). The choice of this proxy is explained by the availability of data covering a large panel of SSA 
countries and a relatively longer period. Nevertheless, as a robustness test, the second dimension of 
political legitimacy is also used. In this regard, the Gallup World Poll’s measure of confidence in 
government is considered. The confidence in national government is the national average of the binary 
responses (either 0 or 1) to the Gallup World Poll question “Do you have confidence in the national 
government, or not?” (Helliwell, Huang, & Wang, 2019). 
The pioneering work (Lotz & Morss, 1967; Shin, 1969) and more recent empirical investigation (Ghura, 
1998; Gupta, 2007; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2008, 2014) on the determinants of fiscal 
capacity has highlighted the role of the level of development, the sectoral composition of domestic 
product, the trade openness and inflation in explaining the cross-country variation in tax revenue.  
In general, the taxation capacity increases with the level of development approximated by per capita 
income. According to Lotz and Morss (1967) when the income per capita increases, the share devoted 
to subsistence needs decreases and more “surplus” is available for other purposes, including taxation 
(broadening of the tax base). This increase rhymes with more consumption of goods and services and 
subsequently more tax revenue (Yogo & Njib, 2018). In addition to the capacity to pay from taxpayers, 
the capacity to collect taxes from state, due to economies of scale, increases with the level of 
development (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2008, 2014). In this paper, GDP per capita in Parity 
Purchasing Power (PPP) (current international $) is used as proxy for level of development and is 
expected to be positively related to tax revenues. 
The empirical literature reveals that the sectoral composition of output determines the tax base and 
therefore tax revenue. Some activities are easy to tax while others are difficult. Taxation of the 
agricultural sector is difficult, especially if it is dominated by many small subsistence producers, 
isolated and operating in the informal sector (Ghura, 1998; Gupta, 2007). Ghura (1998) also maintained 
that the costs of implementing a tax on agricultural activities outweigh the expected gains. In addition, 
entire sections of agricultural activity are exempt from taxes in certain countries for political reasons 
(Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2008). The share of agriculture in GDP is used as a variable of 
control and a negative relationship between this and tax revenue is expected. 
It has been shown in the literature that trade openness affects the level of tax revenue. Transactions in 
foreign trade (imports and exports) are administratively easier to tax than domestic transactions, since 
taxation in this case is made at specified locations, the level of the customs cordon (Lotz & Morss, 
1967; Lotz & Morss, 1970; Gupta, 2007; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2008). Therefore, the 
degree of openness of the economy, measured by the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP is 
expected to be positively associated to tax revenue. 
Similarly, it is argued that macroeconomic environment, captured by inflation rate, affects tax revenue 
(Ghura, 1998). In fact, there is a time lag between when the tax is declared and when it is paid, thereby 
reducing the real tax revenue collected in the event of inflation (Tanzi, 1989). Furthermore, the author 
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points out that since the tax rates of some excise and import duties are specific and not indexed to 
inflation, the tax administration loses resources in the event of price increases. High inflation is eroding 
taxpayers’ purchasing power, reduces their demand for goods and services and in turn tax revenues 
(Yogo & Njib, 2018). Otherwise, Ghura (1998) reported that when the inflation rate is high, economic 
agents, to protect the real value of their wealth, adjust their portfolio so as to privilege assets that 
escape taxation, thereby reducing the tax base. In accordance with this literature, inflation is measured 
by the consumer price index and is expected to be negatively linked to tax revenues. 
The data used cover 41 SSA countries over the period 1996-2017. Tax revenue and the rule of law are 
respectively from Government Revenue Dataset of International Centre for Tax and Development 
(2020) and Worldwide Governance Indicator (World Bank, 2020b). GDP per capita, inflation, trade 
openness and the share of agriculture value added in the GDP are taken from the world development 
indicators database of World Bank (2020a). The confidence in national government is obtained from 
Helliwell, Huang and Wang (2019). 
3.3 Estimation Method 
The empirical model to be estimated is dynamic. In this type of model, the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term (Bond, 2002). Because of this correlation, the Ordinary least squares 
estimator is biased (Yogo & Njib, 2018). Likewise, there is a potential reverse causality between 
political legitimacy and taxation. If the legitimacy of the government allows it to levy more taxes, the 
revenue from taxation allows it to provide basic social services and increase its legitimacy. To deal 
with these endogeneity problems, the generalized method of moments (GMM) is used. This method, in 
addition to endogeneity, addresses the issue of unobserved heterogeneity.  
In practice, there are two variants of GMM estimators: the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991) and the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). Since 
the GMM estimator in system is more efficient than that in first differences (Blundell & Bond, 1998), 
the first is used for empirical investigation. The System-GMM combines the equation in level with the 
equation in difference in a single system of equations. For the equation in level, lagged variables in 
difference are used as instruments and for the equation in first difference, lagged variable in level are 
used as instruments. The estimation is done with the two-step system GMM because it corrects 
heteroscedasticity unlike the one-step estimator. Two tests are used to validate the model. The first is 
the autocorrelation test for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals, AR (2). The second is Sargan 
overidentifying restrictions test for the validity of the instruments. 
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4. Empirical Results  
Before discussing the empirical results, it is important to study the stationarity and the possible 
cointegration of the variables and to present the descriptive statistics.  
4.1 Summary Statistics, Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
Table 1 below summarizes some descriptive statistics of the variables used over the period 1996-2017.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Tax revenue (% of GDP)  864 14.265 8.002 0. 779 56.916 
Political legitimacy 778 -0.660 0.660 -2.129 1.077 
GDP Per capita (current $ in 
PPP) 
898 3895.194 5514.009 443.574 38790. 9 
Agriculture Value Added (% of 
GDP) 
874 23.897 15.007 0.892 79.042 
Trade openness (% of GDP) 857 73.491 38.077 17.858 311.354 
Inflation (consumer prices, 
annual %) 
834 15.888 147.450 -9.616 4145.106 
Source: Authors computation from data. 
 
During the period 1996-2017, the SSA countries mobilized through taxation, an amount representing 
14.27% of the GDP. The political legitimacy indicator shows an average score of -0.66 on a scale of 
-2.5 to +2.5, with -2.5 reflecting a less legitimate government while +2.5 means a more legitimate 
government, which reflects governance issues in the region. The agricultural sector contributed 23% to 
the formation of the GDP during the period under review. Imports and exports represented 73% of 
GDP during the period, reflecting a relatively marked insertion of the region into international trade. 
Over the period 1996-2017, average GDP per capita in SSA was 3895.19 $US in PPP. The inflation 
rate was 15%. It was drawn in particular by Angola which recorded during the period, an average rate 
of 256.87%. 
To verify the stationarity of variables, the tests of Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2002) are carried 
out. The results of these tests are shown in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2. Results from Unit Root Tests 
 
 
 
Variables 
Level First Difference  
 
Order of 
integration 
MW Choi MW Choi 
Z L* Pm Z L* Pm 
Tax 
Revenue 
100. 93* 
(0.076) 
-0.87 
(0.190) 
-1.10 
(0.135) 
1.47* 
(0.069) 
752.44*** 
(0.000) 
-22.87*** 
(0.000) 
-32.40 
*** 
(0.000) 
52.27*** 
(0.000) 
I (1) 
Political 
legitimacy 
119. 
97*** 
(0.004) 
-2.37*** 
(0.008) 
-2.37*** 
(0.009) 
2.96*** 
(0.001) 
    I (0) 
log (GDP 
Per capita) 
56. 81 
(0.99) 
6.85 
(1.00) 
6.55 
(1.00) 
-1.96 
(0.97) 
476.12*** 
(0.000) 
 
-15.66*** 
(0.000) 
-20.30*** 
(0.000) 
30.77*** 
(0.000) 
I (1) 
Agriculture  124. 
87*** 
(0.001) 
-2.25** 
(0.012) 
-2.40*** 
(0.008) 
3.34*** 
(0.000) 
    I (0) 
Trade 
openness 
87. 33 
(0.32) 
-0.82 
(0.20) 
-0.82 
(0.20) 
0.41 
(0.33) 
817. 
72*** 
(0.000) 
-23.43** 
(0.000) 
-35.20*** 
(0.000) 
57.47*** 
(0.000) 
I (1) 
Inflation 607.65*** 
(0.000) 
-17.14*** 
(0.000) 
-25.35*** 
(0.000) 
41.04*** 
(0.000) 
    I (0) 
MWmeans Maddala and Wu. Figures in parenthesis are p-value. ***, ** and * denotes the stationarity 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level. I (0) and I (1) mean that the variable is stationary at level and at first 
difference respectively.  
Source: Authors computation. 
 
The tests of Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2002) gave the same conclusion. The variables related 
to political legitimacy, agriculture and inflation are stationary at level I (0). Conversely, the log of per 
capita income, tax revenue and trade openness are stationary in first difference (integrated of order 1). 
In doing so, it is necessary to check the cointegration of these latter variables. For this purpose, the 
panel cointegration test proposed by Pedroni (1999) is used. Seven tests statistics are considered 
including four based on the within (intra) dimension and three on the between (inter) dimension. All 
these tests are based on the null hypothesis of non-cointegration between the variables. The results of 
these tests are listed in Table 3 below.  
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Table 3. Pedroni Cointegration Tests 
within dimension  
Panel v-Statistic -4.93 
(1.00) 
Panel rho-Statistic -0.74 
(0.22) 
Panel PP-Statistic -21.87 
(0.51) 
Panel ADF-Statistic -10.48 
(0.88B) 
between dimension  
Group rho-Statistic 2.28 
(0.98) 
Group PP-Statistic -25.07*** 
(0.000) 
Group ADF-Statistic -10.84 
(0.85) 
The p-values associated with the tests are shown in parentheses*** indicates rejection of the null 
hypothesis of non-cointegration at 1% level of significance. 
Source: Authors computation. 
 
It appears that out of the seven tests, six validate the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the 
integrated variables of order 1. They are stationary and their first differences are used for empirical 
investigation. 
4.2 Baseline Estimate Results and Discussion 
The results of baseline model are shown in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4. Baseline Result 
Variables Coefficients z-ratio  P-value 
Tax Revenue (lag 1) 0.0119*** 3.01 0.003 
Political legitimacy 0.5703** 2.09 0.036 
log (GDP per capita) 7.5533*** 4.99 0.000 
Agriculture -0.0388*** -4.76 0.000 
Inflation -0.0278*** -7.65 0.000 
Trade openness 0.0153*** 3.93 0.000 
Constant 1.2534*** 9.71 0.000 
Number of Countries 41 
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Wald Test (Prob > CHI2) 0.000 
AR(2) Test p-value 0.53 
Sargan OIR Test p-value 1.000 
*** and * *denote significance at 1% and 5% respectively. 
Source: Authors estimation. 
 
The result of the model validity tests is recorded in the last lines of Table 4. As a result, the Sargan OIR 
test does not reject the null hypothesis of validity of the instruments. Similarly, the AR (2) test reveals 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. In addition, the Wald test makes it possible to judge the 
adequacy of the model, by testing the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are simultaneously zero. 
The result of this test indicates that the null hypothesis of joint nullity of the coefficients is rejected, 
indicating that the parameters are not jointly zero. Hence, the model is adequate and the results can be 
properly interpreted. 
The estimation reveals that the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable has the 
positive sign and is statistically significant at 1% level. This result suggests that the fiscal capacity 
accumulated over time determines that of today. It confirms Besley and Persson (2013)’s point of view 
that the fiscal capacity of countries inherited from the past explains their current fiscal performance.  
In Table 4, results show that political legitimacy has a significant positive effect on tax revenue at 5% 
level of significance. In SSA, the capacity of a government to collect taxes increases with its legitimacy. 
Thus, the more legitimate the government, the higher the tax revenue. The more the government creates 
an environment in which citizens have confidence in and respect the rules established in society, the 
more it reaps the benefits in terms of tax revenue. Particularly, the guarantee of the quality of the 
contract enforcement and property rights, the increased confidence placed in the police and the courts 
and the limitation of crime and violence favour the collection of a higher amount of tax. This result is 
in line with theoretical expectations that tax revenues increase with political legitimacy. Indeed, 
increased political legitimacy favours the voluntary consent of citizens to comply with their tax 
obligations and therefore promotes higher tax revenues (Lledo, Schneider, & Moore, 2004; Yogo & 
Njib, 2018). Likewise, political legitimacy favours the adoption and successful implementation of 
sustainable and legitimate tax reforms, a necessary condition for the substantial increase in tax 
revenues, particularly in developing countries like most SSA countries (DiJohn, 2007; Bird, 2013; 
Akitoby, Baum, Hackney, Harrison, Primus, & Salins, 2020). In addition, political legitimacy, by 
inducing an environment favourable to private initiative and economic growth, broadens the tax base 
and consequently the tax revenue (OECD, 2013; Birskyte, 2014; Castro & Camarillo, 2014). 
Furthermore, political legitimacy contributes to increasing tax revenues by inducing an environment 
where the activities of rent-seeking and tax evasion are limited (Berggren, Bjørnskov, & Lipka, 2015). 
This positive relationship between this dimension of political legitimacy and tax revenue is in 
accordance with the results in earlier studies especially in developing and transition countries (Bird, 
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Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2014) and Association of Southeast Asian Nation countries (Syadullah 
& Wibowo, 2015). However, our result contradicts those obtained by Akande (2017) and Epaphra and 
Massawe (2017) respectively in a sample of SSA countries. The authors found that this dimension of 
political legitimacy does not affect the fiscal capacity, measured by tax revenue as a percentage of 
GDP. 
From the estimates shown in Table 4, it appears that the coefficients associated with the control 
variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant at 1% threshold. The result shows that 
the increase in per capita GDP and greater trade openness lead to increased tax revenue. The results are 
consistent with those of previous studies (Shin, 1969; Ghura, 1998; Gupta, 2007). Conversely, tax 
revenue decreases with a higher level of inflation and a preponderance of agricultural value added in 
GDP (Ghura, 1998; Gupta, 2007; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2008).  
4.3 Robustness Check with an Alternative Indicator of Political Legitimacy 
In this subsection, additional analyses are conducted in order to test the robustness of the result 
obtained in the basic model to the use of an alternative measure of political legitimacy. For this purpose, 
the confidence in national government is used as a proxy of political legitimacy, as suggested by some 
authors (OECD, 2013; Berggren, Bjørnskov, & Lipka, 2015). It is Gallup World Poll’s measure of 
confidence in government compiled by Helliwell, Huang and Wang (2019). Unlike the basic model, the 
sample is reduced to 21 countries and covers the period 2011-2016 due to the availability of data. 
The results of the estimates are reported in Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5. Robustness Checks with Confidence in National Government as Indicator of Political 
Legitimacy 
Variable Coefficients z-ratio P-value 
Tax Revenue (lag 1) 0.905*** 7.75 0.000 
Political legitimacy 0.0207*** 2.63 0.009 
log (GDP per capita) 0.2103 0.18 0.860 
Agriculture 0.0793 1.08 0.281 
Inflation 0.0972*** 3.68 0.000 
Trade openness 0.0436*** 9.08 0.000 
Constante -6. 3664 -0.54 0.592 
Number of Countries 21 
Wald Test (Prob > CHI2) 0.000 
AR (2) Test p-value 0.857 
Sargan OIR Test p-value 0.296 
*** denote significance at 1%. 
Source: Authors estimation. 
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As it is evident in the Table 5, the coefficient political legitimacy approximated by the confidence in 
national government indicator is positive and significant at 1% level. These results mean that an 
increased political legitimacy improves the collect of tax revenue and confirm those obtained in the 
baseline model. Moreover, they are in agreement with the results of previous studies according to 
which confidence in the government increases tax compliance (Marien & Hooghe, 2011; Birskyte, 
2014; Anderson, 2017; Augustine & Rufus, 2019; Saruji, Mohdali, & Mohamed, 2019). Birskyte (2014) 
revealed that in the United States, the higher trust in government improves tax compliance among the 
least compliant taxpayers’ group, the nonfarm sole proprietors. In the same vein, Anderson (2017) has 
evaluated the effect of citizen trust in government institutions on their willingness to pay taxes in a 
sample of 23 transition countries. He concludes that greater trust in government institutions has a 
positive effect on citizens’ expressed willingness to pay taxes. Similarly, a positive relationship has 
been established between trust in government and of tax compliance among adolescents in Malaysia 
(Saruji, Mohdali, & Mohamed, 2019). This conclusion is shared by Augustine and Rufus (2019) who 
found that in Nigeria, the voluntary tax compliance behaviour increases with the trust in the 
government. In the same order of ideas, Marien and Hooghe (2011) reported in a study on European 
countries that citizens having a low level of political trust are significantly more likely to accept illegal 
behaviour such as tax fraud than those with a high levels of political trust. However, it challenges the 
authors’ findings of Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen (2014) who found in a sample of four African countries 
(Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa) that trust in government policy and institutions has not a 
significant correlation with taxpayers’ compliance attitude. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Achieving the sustainable development goals in developing countries requires the mobilization of 
substantial resources to finance human and physical capital. In this perspective, to make funding part of 
sustainability, the mobilization of internal resources, notably tax revenues, remains a great challenge 
for developing countries in general and those of SSA in particular. Therefore, the identification of the 
factors determining the capacity of countries to levy taxes is essential. While the first works mixed the 
emphasis on structural and macroeconomic determinants, the role of institutional determinants is 
increasingly recognized. As part of this strand of literature, this article analyses the effect of political 
legitimacy on tax revenues on a sample of 41 SSA countries over the period 1996-2017. Estimation 
using the system GMM in two steps estimator shows that tax revenue increases with political 
legitimacy. 
This result supports the hypothesis that the political environment determines the fiscal capacity of 
countries. In addition to this variability, per capita income and trade openness increase tax revenue. In 
contrast, tax revenues fall with the rate of inflation and the share of agriculture in the GDP. 
The result of this analysis suggests that the legitimization of public authorities in SSA remains crucial 
to mobilize more resources and adequately finance development. 
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Appendix 1. 
List of Countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
